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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2A.-Vl5/74 
In the Matter of 






CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., NASSAU CHAPTER, 
"~C£SE-SrOT-U=rCr9"3"5~ 
Charging Party. 
The Civil Service Employees Association; Inc., Nassau 
Chapter (CSEA) filed, on July 16, 1973, ah improper practice 
charge against the Massapegua Union Free School District No. 23 
(employer) alleging a violation of Sec. 209-a.l(d) of the Public, 
1 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act).. The gravamen of the 
charge is that the employer has "refused to pay. increments and 
2 
longevity payments due its employees July 1, 19.73." 
The.hearing officer found that "in withholding all 
annual increments" the employer made a unilateral change in terms 
and conditions of employment and thus violated Sec. 209-a.l(d). 
• • , The employer filed the' following exceptions to the 
hearing officer1s.decision: 
(1) Under the expired contract between the 
parties, the employees were not entitled to 
an incremental advance and that the cost of 
such incremental advances was a cost factor 
to be considered in negotiations for a suc-
cessor contract; 
1 This section makes.it an improper employer practice to deliber-
ately "...refuse to negotiate in good faith with the duly 
recognized or certified representative of its public employees." 
It- was stated at the close of the hearing that the charge as to 
the longevity payments would be withdrawn if the payments were 
made. The attorney for the employer has stated in his brief 
that such payments were made and this statement has not been 
challenged. We will deal, therefore, only with the charge as 
to the failure to pay increments. 
• li2R8 
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(2) The employer acted under a substantial j 
claim of contractual privilege and this 
Board should defer to the grievance pro-
I 
cedures of the contract; j 
(3) The charge should be dismissed for ! 
failure of the charging party to serve a 
copy thereof upon the employer in accordance j 
,: •—• -with.-Sec--2-04—1-C-e) of -the-Rules of -the Board j -•-'— •, 
. . . , 1 .—_^ 
We shall consider these exceptions in inverse order. 
The record supports the contention of the employer that j 
i 
CSEA did not serve a copy of the subject charge' upon the employer ! " 
3 i 
as required by Sec. 204.1(c) of the'Rules of this Board. A j 
witness for the employer testified a copy was not delivered to the j 
• • . I 
office of the employer by CSEA. CSEA offered no evidence to con- j 
• I 
travene such testimony. The employer urges on this record that I 
the charge herein should be dismissed. We do not agree; rather, 
we adopt the reasoning and conclusion of the hearing officer on 
this issue. The charge was filed on July 16, 1973 and the employer 
did receive a copy of the charge on July 21, .1973 in a communica-
tion from this Board. There is no showing in this record, nor is 
. it'claimed by the employer, that it was in any way prejudiced in 
not receiving a copy of the charge prior to July 2.1st. Thus', we j 
do not sustain this exception. • j 
T,he second exception is that the employer acted under a 
substantial claim of contractual privilege and this Board should, 
therefore, defer to the grievance procedure provided in the 
agreement between the parties. 
This Board has stated that not every violation of a 
contract is per se an improper practice and that it is not the ! 
function of this Board to police and enforce contracts between 
3_ This section of the Rules has since been repealed. Rule 204.2(a) 
now provides that a copy of the charge will be sent to the 
respondent with the notice of hearing, the procedure followed 
in this case. 
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public employers and employee organizations. Further, this Board 
has indicated that where the conduct complained of might constitute 
an improper practice as well as a contract violation, it will defer! 
to the grievance-arbitration procedures agreed upon by the parties 
where the charged party asserts, with a basis therefor, that its j 
action was predicated on a substantial claim of contractual priv-
ilege. The basis for this deferral policy is that the basic issue 
ris^ ons-af—C£mtr.act-_rin£erpr_e±a±ion^ andi^ t±ta:t^ th 
for the arbitrator's interpretation. i 
i 
Thus, assuming arguendo that the employer predicated its j 
conduct on its interpretation of the contract (this will be dis-
cussed later), this exception is without merit. It has been our 
practice not to defer to a grievance procedure unless it terminates 
in binding arbitration, Matter of Board of Education of the City 
of Hew York, 6 PERB 3006 (1973). The contract herein does not so ! 
provide; rather, it provides only for a procedure in the nature of j 
advisory arbitration. 
The final exception deals with the application of the 
Board's "Triborough" doctrine, Matter of Triborough Bridge and 
Tunnel Authority, 5 PERB 3037 (1972). The facts of the Triborough 
case are not too dissimilar, to the facts here. There, the parties | 
in 19 69 agreed to an incremental system based on length of service I 
which was incorporated into the written agreement. There was no j 
express provision in the Triborough contract as to,whether the 
i 
incremental system would survive the expiration of that contract.' | 
The contract expired on June 30, 1971 while the parties were nego- j 
i 
tiating a successor ,agreement. After expiration of the agreement, i 
the employer maintained the salary and fringe benefit provisions ofj 
' - ' I • 
the contract, but refused to pay increments to those employees I 
whose anniversaries of employment occurred subsequent to the expir-j 
ation of the contract. This Board held that this withholding of j 
the increment constituted a unilateral change in a term and condi- ! 
i 
tion of employment and thus was a violation of the Act. We reasoned 
i 
that the statutory prohibition against an employee organization j 
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I 
resorting to self-help by striking imposed a correlative duty 
upon a public employer to refrain from altering terms and condi-
i 
tions of employment unilaterally during the course of negotiations.j 
i 
The employer in the instant case does not appear to 
.challenge the basic concept of the Triborough decision that after 
expiration of a contract and during the course of negotiations the 
employee organization is entitled to a maintenance of the status 
-quotas—to—term s^ -an^ ^ 
expired contract. During the course of negotiations for a suc-
cessor contract, the employer adopted the following resolution: 
"RESOLVED, that the status quo continue and that 
all of the terms and conditions of employment 
contained in the aforesaid described expired 
agreement be continued in effect, specifically 
including salaries, retirement and longevity 
increases after ten (10) and fifteen (15) years 
of consecutive service, sick leave, fully paid 
hospitalization, personal days, and grievance 
procedure until a new agreement has been con-
cluded." 
However,: the. employer contends that the Triborough '• 
doctrine should not apply to incremental advances. In this con-
nection it further resolved: 
"that the maintenance of the status quo as 
aforesaid., expressly shall not1 include advance-
ment of employees to the next step on the salary 
schedule, inasmuch as the expired agreement spe-
cifically provides that 'steps on the salary scale 
do not reflect years of service', and further that 
the cost of such advancement is estimated at ' 
$11,169.00, and such factor has been and should 
accordingly continue to be the subject of nego-
tiations and a.factor to be considered by the 
parties therein.-" 
Moreover, the employer alleges that it was authorized, by contract 
to withhold increments. , 
The record reveals that in 195 8 there was a twelve-step 
salary schedule and that on July 1st of each year each employee 
received a step or incremental increase. This practice continued 
until 19 69 when, in the course of negotiations, the twelve steps 
were reduced to nine. 
The employer produced documentary evidence that in the 
19 69 negotiations for the 19 69-70 contract it proposed the following 
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language to be included in the contract concomitant with the re-
duction of' steps from twelve to nine that "Steps appearing on 
the salary schedule do not refer to years of service...." The 
employer's business manager, Stayne, testified that he proposed 
the language to CSEA saying that the employer wished to be in a 
position to withhold the increment of an employee and that the 
increments should not be automatic. In essence, it was the 
-emplr6yer-'-s—posd-t-i6h~thTa;t^  
be the subject of negotiations. CSEA rejected the proposed 
language and the employer- proposed it again in 1970. 
CSEA disputes that the employer.proposed such language. 
Rather, it contends that it suggested this language in 1970 for 
the 1970-71 contract. Its stated purpose in making this proposal 
was to ensure that an employee's eligibility for a longevity 
increase after ten years of service would not be clouded by the 
• 4 
"reduction in salary steps from twelve to nine. The employer agreed! 
to•the inclusion of this language in the agreement and it has 
remained in successor one-year agreements to date. 
It does not .appear necessary to resolve the question, as 
to.who first proposed this language for it may be that each 
accepted the language for its own purpose as set forth above. 
Whatever else each .of-the parties may have intended to accomplish 
by the language in question, it.is clear that CSEA did not intend 
to waive increments. As we have noted in Matter of Mount Vernon, 
5 PERB 3100 (1972), a waiver by an employee organization must be 
explicit. 
It is significant to note that, although since.1969 the 
employees did not receive the increments on July 1st and the 
increments were not paid until an over-all agreement had been 
negotiated, the increments were always paid retroactively to July i 
i 
I 
1st. - i 
. I 
_4 CSEA's concern in this regard is somewhat difficult to under-
stand since it is clearly provided in Article VI.4 of the 
agreement and again on the salary schedule that longevity pay-
ments are due after ten consecutive years of service. There is 
no reference to or incorporation of salary steps in longevity 
eligibility. 
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In the negotiations subsequent to 1969 it appears to 
have been the practice of the employer to attempt to negotiate an 
across-the-board increase which would absorb the increment, but 
CSEA consistently rejected such proposals and the settlements 
always included the increments plus a percentage increase. 
Finding no' waiver•of increments by CSEA, we now consider 
| 
the principles underlying our Triborough decision in order to j 
! 
ascer-tain--i-ts-applisabi-l-i-ty--to-increments.—The answer- is. that the i 
i 
Triborough case involved increments and, as such, is directly in | 
| 
point. • j 
Although our Triborough decision was pronounced solely j 
in terms of reference to the public sector in general and the New 
York Act in particular, it is a policy long recognized in the 
private sector. It would seem to be well settled under the 
National Labor Relations. A.ct that an employer may not cancel in-
.surance plans, eliminate holidays, vacations, sick leave or cut 
wages in order to bring economic pressure on employees to accept 
the employer's offer or to abandon the employees' demands, Borden, 
Inc., 196 NLRB No. 172 (1972), 80 LRRM 1240. Further, as pointed 
I 
out by the Supreme Court of the United States, the rights of j 
employees to such benefits as severance pay, vacation pay, and i 
pension benefits do not automatically terminate upon the expiration! 
of the agreement establishing them and the employer is bound to 
honor them beyond the term of the contract, Wiley v. Livingstone, 
376 U.S. 543; Steelworkers v. Porter, 64 LRRM 2201 (D.C., W.Pa. 1966). 
i 
This is the thrust of the Triborough decision and, as the Board has: 
. 1 
indicated, the reasons therefor are far more compelling in the j 
public sector of this State because of the strike prohibition. i 
In the instant case, the incremental system was a well 
established term and condition of employment. The employer may not 
unilaterally change such term and condition. The employer's con-
tention, based on the contract language and.practice that it had 
the right-to withhold the increment, would have validity only if 
there had been a waiver by- CSEA of its right to bargain on this 
' ' 'I 
Qrifin . ! 
Board 0-0935 
issue. As we have pointed out, CSEA never agreed to waive its 
rights to negotiate on the issue of annual increments. 
The final contention of the employer that increments are 
a cost factor which should be the subject of negotiations is not 
without merit, but the factthatlvbKfiy'.ria're"'.acost factor provides no 
basis for the unilateral abolition as a negotiating tactic. 
NOW, THEREFORE., IT IS ORDERED that Massapegua Union Free 
^=^Z=^Z==^±J:—-J-_I^_-=S^-h66l—DlS^r^-t—NOV^ 
from refusing to grant increments in 
accordance with the contract that expired 
on July 1, 1973, retroactive payment of 
such increments to include interest thereon 
at the rate of three percent per annum. . 
I 
Dated: Albany, New York 
April 15, 1974 
Robert D. Helsby,/Chairman 
32k 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 





ELMSFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
Charging Party. 
CASE NO. D-0795 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions filed by the 
Elmsford Police Department (charging party) to the hearing 
officer's decision dismissing a charge that the Village ..of 
Elmsford refused to negotiate in good faith, thus violating 
CSL §209-a.l(d). The alleged violation was a payment by the 
Village of a salary increase to three patrolmen in violation of 
its contract with the charging party and without the consent of 
the charging party. In its defense, the Village has alleged that 
the salary increases. had been granted pursuant to its contract 
with the charging party. 
The hearing officer concluded that.the issue between the 
parties involved the interpretation of their contract and, that no 
question involving a duty to negotiate in.good faith had been 
raised. Accordingly,' he dismissed the charge. In its exceptions, 
the charging party argues that the hearing officer's decision is 
contrary to the evidence which indicates that neither explicitly 
nor implicitly did the contract provide salary increases for the j 
three policemen; hence, what the. Village did amounts to a unilateral 
change of terms and conditions of employment. 
Having reviewed the evidence and considered the argu-
ments ' of the parties, we ascertain that the hearing officer's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law are correct. The contraci 
between the parties covering the period from June 1, 1971 to May 
31, 1972 had eliminated the entrance grade for policemen,, but was 
i 
silent about the implications of this circumstance upon the salaries 
mm i 
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of policemen in higher grades. When a new policeman was employed 
under the agreement at a salary higher than the former entrance 
level, three other policemen whose salaries were at lower grades 
grieved that their salaries, too, should be raised because, in 
effect, the change in the entrance level bumped their salary levels 
upward. This proposal was viewed with disfavor by other policemen 
whose salaries were at the top of the scale, unless their salaries, 
too, would be raised. The charging party supported this latter 
position. Although the contract did not provide for the arbitra-
tion of grievances, the Village gave it conscientious attention and 
decided in favor of the three grieving policemen. 
We agree with our hearing officer that the sole question 
was one of contract interpretation, and .-we adopt .his 'ratio'iial-e:-' 
Accordingly, the charge should be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
Dated: Albany, New York 
April 15, 1974 ' 
Robert D. HelsbW Chairman 
32%'' 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 





WESTCHESTER CHAPTER, CIVIL SERVICE 
(EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party. 
CASE NO. U-0840 
After reviewing the record, the exceptions filed and 
hearing, oral argument, we adopt the finding of the hearing officer 
that respondent violated §209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Act in failing 
[to pay the increments due on January 1, 1973. In reaching this con^  
lusio.n we are not unmindful that respondent's salary schedule must 
be approved by federal and state agencies. However, respondent has 
not demonstrated on this record that the requirements of such 
agencies precluded the payment of the incremental advances due on 
January 1, 1973. The hearing officer found, and'we agree, that no 
further approval by such agencies was."required to pay the incre-
ments in January 1973...." J 
The hearing officer's recommended order provided in part 
that the respondent make restitution to those employees who were 
entitled to the increments on January 1, 1973. However, the hearing 
officer further recommended that the payment of $250 made in June 
L973 retroactive to January 1, 1973 be treated as a set-off against 
phe amount due for the increment. 
The hearing officer apparently concluded that this pay- j 
ment of $250 was in lieu of the increment. We are not persuaded 
hat the record establishes that the payment of $2 50 was in lieu of 
he increment. The chief accountant of respondent was a. witness, 
out his testimony was silent on'this point. O'Connor, a field rep- ! 
resentative of CSEA was called as a witness by respondent. He was 
juestioned as to the $250: Q. Was it ever characterized as' in lieu 
II 
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of anything? 
A. No s i r . 
In argument before the hearing officer, counsel for 
respondent did. state the payment was in lieu of the increment, but. : 
there is no evidence in this record to support counsel's contention; 
Further, there are 63 employees in the negotiating unit,> 
' .1 
21 of. whom were in the maximum salary step and thus not entitled to 
an incremental advance. The record is barren of any evidence that 
they did not receive the $250 payment, which 'would have been the j 
case if the payment of $250 were in lieu of the increment. j 
Under the issue entitled "Amount of Salary Increase for 
Years 1972 and 1973", the factfinder adopted respondent's position 
which was: 
1972 - 4% I 
January 1, 1973 $250 j 
July 1, 1973 '5.5% | 
The effective date of the increment was separately 
treated by the factfinder, who recommended that the effective date 
remain at January 1st. Obviously, there was no tie-in between the j 
$250 and the increment. , j 
' . . ' • ' • . ' ' I 
Respondent accepted the factfinder's recommendation as j 
i 
to the above salary increases, but rejected his recommendation as 
' • A 
to the effective date for increment, and adopted a' July 1st date. 
This record warrants the conclusion that the payment of 
$250 was not in lieu of an increment, but was a general salary j 
increase paid to all employees whether or not they were entitled to j 
an incremental advance. I 
Therefore, the payment of $250 may not be considered as 
. i 
a set-off.and the respondent must make restitution for incremental 
advances due eligible employees, for the period, January 1, 1973 to 
July 1, 1973. 
Board - U-0840 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that: 
,1. The respondent cease and desist from 
refusing to pay increments when due to'those 
of its employees entitled to such increments 
under'the now expired contract, and 
2. The respondent make restitution to those 
_i._^ _^ _^ __^ : of- its employees who- were en-t-itled to 
increments between January 1, 1973 and 
July 1, 1973 by paying them the amount due 
them, together with 3 percent interest 
thereon. 
Dated: Albany, New York 
April 15, 19 74 
STATE OF NEW YORK #2D-4/15/74 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
BOARD DECISION 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, 
Respondent, : AND ORDER 
DISTRICT COUNCIL 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, : . CASE NO. U-0829 
Charging Party. 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the New 
York City Board of Education (respondent) and cross-exceptions 
filed by District Council 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (AFSCME) to a 
decision of a hearing officer finding that respondent had failed 
to negotiate in good faith in violation of CSL §209-a.l(d). 
The issue is, whether an employer that has recognized an employee 
organization to represent a negotiating unit and then engages in 
dilatory negotiating tactics can then refuse to negotiate with 
the employee organization if it alleges that the negotiating unit 
has become inappropriate. . 
The charge originally filed by AFSCME on April 9, 1973 
and amended on August 1, 1973, alleges that respondent delayed in tHe 
scheduling of negotiating sessions., failed to make responses or 
counterproposals to AFSCME's demands and eventually refused to 
negotiate with AFSCME at all pending determination of the appro-
priateness of the negotiating unit and AFSCME's representation 
status. Respondent's answer asserts that the schedule of meetings 
had been acceptable to AFSCME; the failure to make responses and 
counterproposals was necessarily occasioned by the requirements 
of Education Law §2590(g)(6), which requires it to consult with 
community boards of education; and that it had a good faith doubt 
as to the appropriateness of the negotiating unit and of AFSCME's 
majority status. , 
3300 I 
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The sequence of events is significant; the relevant events 
and circumstances and their dates are as follows: 
1.. AFSCME was recognized to represent a unit comprising all . 
employees in the title of community center attendant on 
June 9, 1972. 
2. Respondent's fiscal year runs from July 1 through June 3Q. 
3. On January 31, 1973 AFSCME submitted a list of contract 
demands^ •. -.---.— -. - --.- - _ 
4. Respondent agreed to meet with AFSCME on March 19, 1973. The 
. meeting was held on that date, at which time AFSCME explained 
its demands. Respondent explained that it was required to 
consult with the thirty-two community school boards before 
it could formulate a response. 
5. Respondent refused to meet'again until April 4, 1973. At the i 
meeting held on that day it advised AFSCME that it had been 
unable to review the demands with the community school boards 
and therefore could not respond. 
6> The original charge herein was filed on April 9, 1973. 
7. A pre-hearing conference" on this charge was held on April 27, 
1973,- at which time the parties' agreed to resume negotiations. 
8. After additional negotiations which did. not yield an agreement,' 
respondent notified AFSCME on July 26, 1973 that, on the basis 
of information obtained in the course of preparation for that 
negotiations session indicating that the negotiating unit was. 
no longer appropriate and 'AFSCME no longer represented a , 
majority of the employees then in the unit, it was terminating 
negotiations. 
9. On August 1, 19 73, the charge was amended to include 
respondent's termination of negotiations. 
The hearing officer determined that respondent's conduct 
in January and February following receipt of demands from AFSCME 
was dilatory and that its negotiating posture during May and June 
was evasive. He then rejected respondent's argument that twelve 
i 
months having elapsed since the date of recognition, it was free : 
33-iJ'i 
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on July 26, 1973 to terminate negotiations with AFSCME because it 
had a good faith doubt that the negotiating unit was appropriate 
and that AFSCME represented a majority of the employees within the 
unit. In its exceptions, respondent alleges that the circumstances 
prior to July 26 are irrelevant because if a unit becomes inap-
propriate, the employer has no further obligation to negotiate with 
the representative of that unit. It does not contest findings that 
l_ts—prxolr—nT=gbtt3^^ 
the hearing officer's recommended order directing it to negotiate 
as being "a determination that 'two wrongs will make a right'." 
AFSCME filed cross-exceptions alleging that several of the hearing 
officer's findings of fact are contrary to the evidence and that 
his proposed remedy, is inadequate. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the arguments 
of the parties, we affirm the hearing officer's findings.of fact 
and conclusions of law. 
Respondent was duty-bound to negotiate with AFSCME upon 
receipt of AFSCME's demands. Consistent with the statutory nego-
j r • • 
tiating schedule set forth in CSL §209, the parties should have 
attempted to reach agreement before July 1, 1973, the beginning of 
respondent's new fiscal year. Having precluded a timely agreement 
by its own dilatory negotiating tactics, respondent cannot there-
after be permitted to abandon negotiations because of a right that 
it claims accrued and information it alleges it obtained sub-
sequently. Moreover, neither the claimed right nor the alleged 
information is compelling. The nature of the information is that 
(1) there had been a high turnover among the 
i 
employees in the negotiating unit and only a few j 
of the employees who had originally signed AFSCME J 
designation cards were still employed by respondent,. } 
I 
and I 
• ' - , ' ' • ! 
(2) many of the new employees were students. • i 
I 
Whether or not AFSCME had lost the support of the majority of the 
employees and whether or not the students who worked for respondent 
•4 J! •; -J if 
Board - U-0829 . • • -4 
were employees within the comprehension of the Taylor Law is not 
established by respondent's new information. The decisions cited j 
i 
j 
by respondent for the proposition that a year having elapsed since i 
i 
recognition, it had become free to abandon that recognition, are j 
not applicable to the instant set of facts under the Taylor Law. 
CSL §208.2 relates an employee organization's period of un- j 
challenged representation status to the fiscal year of the employer. 
i 
~Th~e—la^ rgu'ffge-o"f~^ te 
Rules, provide that the status of AFSCME as representative of the 
negotiating unit in question could be challenged during the month i 
of November. We have ruled in Matter of the County of Jefferson, 
4 PERB 3702 (1971) that an employer need not file a decertification 
petition; "-±t may unilaterally alter a negotiating unit but, as 
indicated in that decision, this' may only be done during the time 
when a petition for decertification, would be timely. 
In support of .its exceptions, respondent argues that if a , 
unit for which an employee organization is recognized is inappro-
priate, there is never any obligation oh the part of the employer 
to negotiate with that organization because there had been "no 
statutory obligation to recognize the Onion in the first instance."! 
Inherent in respondent's argument is the theory that a contract 
with AFSCME would be null because many of the persons now within 
the negotiating unit are students and thus are not covered by the 
Taylor Law. . We do .not reach the question of whether such students 
are covered by. the Taylor Law or whether, if not, they would be | 
covered by the terms of an agreement. This question may or may not 
be resolved by this Board or perhaps by an arbitrator in some other 
more appropriate proceeding in which all the relevant facts are 
presented. We note, however, that it is not inconsistent with the j 
i 
terms .of the Taylor Law for. a determination to be made that persons) 
. i 
currently in a negotiating unit are not employees within the mean-
ing of the Taylor Law and yet for them to remain in that negoti-
ating unit and continue to enjoy the protections of the Taylor Law i 
Board U-0829 -5 
until the expiration of the period of unchallenged representation 
of their negotiation representative (CSL §201.7(a)). For the 
purposes of this case it is sufficient to determine that respondent 
cannot question its own action- in recognizing AFSCME nor avoid 
the.statutory consequences of that action except at the time per-
mitted by the Taylor Law and our Rules. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the New York City 
' Board~of~EdU"ca"tronV"W'xth"regaxd:~to:::- the-^ unxfc-^ ox--1-^  
community center attendants, 
1. Cease and desist from refusing to continue 
good faith negotiations with AFSCME; 
2. Cease and desist from refusing to schedule 
negotiating sessions within a'reasonable time 
span; . 
.3. Cease and desist from failing to be adequately 
prepared during negotiations to discuss relevant 
. . matters; 
4. Upon request, to resume good faith nego-
tiations with AFSCME forthwith, such negotiations 
to include, if AFSCME so demands, the time span 
in which it was in violation of its obligation 
to negotiate in good faith. 
Dated: Albany, New York 
April 15, 19 74 , 
'Robert D. Helsby, /Chairman 
aio4 
J 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2E-Vl5 /74 
In the Mat ter of 
CITY 0? NEW ROCHELLE, 
Respondent., 
- and-





CASE NO. U-0810 
BACKGROUND -
The City .of New Rochelle.unilaterally reallocated the 
job of a maintenance welder from Labor Grade VI to Labor Grade VII 
This reallocation was accompanied by a concomitant increase in 
pay from $9,890 to $10,580 for the individual involved. The City's 
action carried an ••effective date of January 1, 1973-
Officials of^Local 663., Council 66, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
commenced a series of inquiries and meetings with City representa-
tives relative to the reallocation. The initial inquiries took 
place prior to the implementation of the reallocation, in response 
to which the City denied that any job reallocations had taken 
place. Subsequently, after repeated inquiries by the union and 
after several additional meetings between City and.union officials, 
the City admitted that the reallocation had taken place as of 
January 1, 1973-. 
AFSCME filed an improper, practice charge under Part 204 
of the Rules of Procedure of the New York State Public Employment 
Relations Board charging a violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Public ' 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act)—. • The charge alleged'that 
during the term of a collective agreement, the City unilaterally 
1 This Section of the Act makes it' an improper employer practice 
to "(d)...refuse to negotiate in good faith with the duly 
recognized or certified representative of its public employees." 
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reallocated the job of maintenance welder from Labor Grade VI to 
Labor Grade VII in violation of the agreement, and subsequently 
failed to live up to an agreement between the parties to withdraw 
the reallocation and to negotiate whether or npt the job should 
be reallocated. 
The hearing officer determined that there was merit to 
the charge and fashioned a recommended order which would require 
the District to cease and desis't from classifying the job of 
~ma"i"ntyn~anc~e~~we~raeT~^ ^ 
quo ante by reclassifying the job to; Labor Grade VI. 
The matter comes before us on respondent•employerrs 
exceptions alleging errors in the hearing officer's decision and 
recommended order rendered January 18, 19 7^ -
.EMPLOYER'S EXCEPTIONS 
The City excepts to the hearing officer's failure, to 
find that the contractual grievance procedure was the exclusive 
means for resolving the matter in issue-. The employer points out 
that since the grievance machinery was not utilized by the union, 
that it (the union)' has failed to exhaust it's remedies provided by 
the contract. Reference is made to the fact that binding arbitra-
tion is available under the contract and further that, should the 
matter not have been resolved to the satisfaction ,of the union 
through the lower steps of the grievance procedure, the issue could 
have been submitted to an arbitrator for decision. 
The employer's second exception.relates to the alleged 
failure of the hearing officer to find that the employer had 
observed and kept the terms of the agreement, and had not committed 
any improper practices. In support of this exception, the employer 
contends that in the past, it has freely exercised the right of 
making job reallocations, and by virtue of this established past 
practice, it now retains this prerogative as one of its management 
rights. Additionally, the City points out various sections of the 
contract with which it has•complied in regard to the instant matter. 
Specific reference is made to the following: 
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a) Article- II, Section 3— which requires 
the employer to notify the union of all new hires, 
• terminations and any changes affecting the job 
or pay status of employees. The employer stresses 
that there is'no requirement in.this section for 
the union to be notified before action is taken 
and further, that there is no time limit specified 
- - -- f or:--s-ueh- not-i-f -ication-. -----—1-^—,.-~-. •--— - -
b)' Article IV, Section 1— which specifically 
excludes from the grievance machinery disputes 
involving personnel authorizations. The employer 
interprets this provision to mean that' personnel 
authorizations?as well as job allocations are to 
be excluded from the negotiating - process. 
c) Article VII, Section 7— which, according 
to the City's interpretation, sets forth only the 
minimum increase to be accorded an employee upon 
labor grade reallocation. The City urges that this 
section.does not prohibit the employer from granting 
an increase to an employee which exceeds the minimum. 
"3. Notification of Personnel Changes.- The EMPLOYER agrees to 
notify the UNION of all new hires.or terminations occurring 
within the bargaining unit, as well as of .changes affecting the 
job or pay status of employees in the bargaining unit. This 
notification shall be in the form of a copy of the official 
personnel.action authorization by means of which such changes 
are effected." . 
"This procedure shall be used in seeking the settlement of any 
grievance or dispute which may arise between the parties, in-
cluding the application, interpretation or enforcement of this 
AGREEMENT. However, matters shall not be handled under this 
procedure involving alteration of wage rate schedules, retire-
ment benefits established elsewhere in. this AGREEMENT, or of 
established budget appropriations or personnel authorization." 
"7- Wage Increase Upon Labor Grade Reallocation. When a position 
class is reallocated from a lower to a higher grade in the labor 
grade schedule, all incumbents for positions in that' class shall 
have their wages increased by an amount which is equal to one-
haif of the-value of the normal service increment applicable to 
the higher grade. However, no employee whose class has been 
reallocated from a lower to a higher labor grade shall be paid 
a wage which is less than the minimum for the higher grade." 
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d) Article VII, Section 13(a)— which provides 
for the scope of review granted to the City's 
Director of Personnel. The-employer submits that 
this section does not mandate the City to negotiate 
reallocations with the union, but instead merely 
affords the union the opportunity to submit requests 
for reallocation to the Director of Personnel. 
-Eln.ally.j-. the...City.._assert-S--in-.suppO-rt of -its exception, .that_in,.—-. 1 -. . - _-. -
accordance with-its interpretation of. a local ordinance, job 
reallocations are not terms and conditions of employment and thus 
are not mandatory subjects of collective negotiation. 
The employer's final exception urges that the hearing 
officer's proposed order is.beyond the-limits imposed by §205.-5(d) 
of the Act. According to the employer,. PERB is authorized only to 
issue' an order to a violating party requiring it to "negotiate in 
good faith". . ' - • 
DISCUSSION 
We concur with the'hearing officer's sustentation of the 
charge. - .' 
In previous decisions, the Board has held that where the 
action complained of presents both a question of violation of the . . 
statute and a.breach of contract, deference will not be made to 
the contractual grievance machinery unless conclusive disposition 
of the matter can be consummated by binding arbitration.— While 
binding arbitration is available under the contract as argued in 
the employer's first exception, it is not available for the purpose 
of resolving, the matter at issue. It is noted that- Article IV, 
5. "13- Requests for Reallocation or Reclassification. (a) The 
Director of Personnel shall hear, consider and make recommenda-
tions to the City Manager on all questions' pertaining to. the 
allocation of positions' to labor grades, or for the occupational 
reclassification of positions as may be referred to him by the 
UNION." 
6_ In the Matter of Board of Education of the City of New York, 
6 PERB 3022, 3024 (January 24, 1973). 
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Section 1 of the agreement specifically removes disputes involving 
the alteration of wage rate schedules and personnel authorizations 
from the grievance procedure. Since the City's action which pre-
cipitated the improper.practice charge relates to wages as well as 
personnel authorizations, the matter clearly falls outside the 
scope of the contractual grievance machinery. -..Thus, the issue 
cannot be conclusively resolved by binding arbitration and, 
contrary to the employer's first exception, the union's pursuit 
of its statutory remedy is appropriate. 
The employer's argument that it has complied with various 
sections of the contract is not persuasive since there is no 
provision in the agreement which grants to the employer the right 
to change wages and other terms and conditions of employment 
unilaterally and without prior negotiations as required by §204.of 
the Act. Moreover, in further reference to that part of the 
second exception which alleges that a local ordinance impliedly 
excluded job reallocations.for local employees from their terms 
and' conditions of employment, it is noted that local laws are not' 
in pari materia with the Taylor Law. 
With regard to that portion of .the hearing officer's 
recommended order which would restore, the job of maintenance welder 
from Labor Grade VII to Labor Grade VI, we do not believe that such 
action on our part is necessary in order to effectuate the purposes 
of the Act, particularly in view of the union's supportive position 
with regard to permitting the employee to retain the benefits of 
his upgraded job. • 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the City cease and desist 
from reallocating labor grade jobs of employees in the negotiating 
unit unilaterally. 
Dated: April 15, 1974 
Albany, New York 
• Robert D. Helsby, Chairman 
Joseph R. Crowley 
Fred L.- Denson 
